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Abstract
If blockchain networks are to become the building blocks of the infrastructure for
the future digital economy, then several challenges related to the resiliency and surviv-
ability of blockchain networks need to be addressed. The survivability of a blockchain
network is influenced by the diversity of its nodes. Trustworthy device-level attestations
permits nodes in a blockchain network to provide truthful evidence regarding their cur-
rent configuration, operational state, keying material and other system attributes. In the
current work we review the recent developments towards a standard attestation architec-
ture and evidence conveyance protocols. We explore the applicability and benefits of a
standard attestation architecture to blockchain networks. Finally, we discuss a number
of open challenges related to node attestations that has arisen due to changing model
of blockchain network deployments, such as the use virtualization and containerization
technologies for nodes in cloud infrastructures.
Keywords: blockchains, trusted computing, attestations, virtual assets.
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1 Introduction
We believe there is a crucial role for trusted computing technologies, and more specially
attestations technologies, within the nascent area of blockchain networks. As blockchain
networks play an increasing role in the future digital economy [1] – such as becoming the
underlying infrastructure for future crypto-currencies and virtual assets exchange networks
– the security, resiliency and survivability of blockchain systems becomes crucial to their
business value-proposition. Since the dawn of the computer age and the development of
networked computer systems and the Internet, there has been the need for operators of
computing equipment to obtain correct and truthful insights into the state of computing
devices as part of managing the security of these devices. Given the proliferation of malware
and viruses in the past decade, there has been a need for networked devices to have the
capability to report its configuration, internal state and other parameters in a truthful and
unforgeable manner. The technical term used to describe this process is attestations.
The goal of the current work is threefold. The first is to review the current develop-
ment towards a standard attestation architecture in the computer and network industry.
Secondly, to explore the applicability and benefits of the attestations architecture to nodes
in a blockchain network. Thirdly, we discuss some of the current challenges in attestations
that has arisen due to changing model of blockchain networks, such as the use virtualization
technologies for nodes in cloud infrastructures.
The subject of attestations is at least two decades old – stemming from the industry
efforts around the Trusted Platform Module (TPM hardware) [2] – and numerous research
papers have been devoted to this subject. Because the area of trusted computing has been
heavily influenced by the design of the TPM hardware, much of the discourse in the broader
research literature has been focused on one feature or another of the TPM hardware (e.g.
the functions of its PCR registers, its identity keys, the Quote protocol, sealing, the agility
of ciphers, and so on).
In the current work instead of providing a TPM-centric technical discussion around at-
testations and the required infrastructure to support TPM-based attestations, our goal is to
discuss the notion of attestations in an accessible and meaningful manner. As such, we will
strive to abstract-up from the various design features of the TPM and focus on the intent of
some of these features, narrowing our interest on those features that support attestation and
its potential use in blockchain networks. We direct readers to the excellent works of [3, 4, 5]
for a deeper treatment of the TPM and its features.
2 Attestations of Blockchain Nodes: Motivations
There are a number of possible benefits derived from the use of device-level attestations in
the context of blockchain networks generally. The ability for a node to provide a truthful,
complete and unforgeable report regarding its configuration, computational state, keying
material and other system attributes provides a foundation to building trust (technical trust)
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in the network as a whole.
• Node device identification: In some blockchain deployments (e.g. permissioned blockchain
networks) the ability to identify a node, authenticate and obtained signed assertions
(e.g. reports) from the node provides a crucial feature for the manageability of the
network.
Attestation evidence must be source-authentic from the device. This means that at-
testation evidence or assertions must be signed by a private-key that is bound to the
hardware (or a private-key that is derived from a hardware-bound key). A key that
is hardware-bound means that it cannot be removed from the hardware (i.e. removal
attack is uneconomical). Furthermore, a hardware-bound key may even be inaccessi-
ble (invisible) to the user’s application. A user’s application would instead use keys
derived from this hardware-bound key. An example of this is the certified-keys in the
TPM hardware (e.g. AIK-certified keys) [6].
• Node device configuration reporting: The ability for nodes in a blockchain network to
truthfully report its device configuration (i.e. hardware, firmware, software) allows the
questions related to fairness in the distribution of computing power (e.g. hashing rate)
and other computing capabilities to begin to be addressed [7, 8].
Detailed reporting of hardware configurations can be achieved using composite attesta-
tions approach (see Section 4.4). For example, the ability for a node to provide truthful
and unforgeable evidence regarding the number of GPU cards (for hash-power increase)
based on composite attestations allows a third-party verifier to glean as to the actual
hash-power available at that node. This in turn allows a community of node-owners in
a permissioned blockchain network, for example, to obtain accurate estimations regard-
ing the hash-powers available at each of the members. Such estimations allows fairness
to be more readily achieved.
• Diversity of nodes and survivability of blockchain networks: The ability for nodes to
truthfully generate unforgeable evidence of its device configuration permits the ques-
tion of network diversity – and therefore network survivability [9, 10] – to begin to be
addressed.
The question of the diversity of nodes (i.e. diversity of software stack and hardware) was
also touched upon by NIST in their report (NISTIR 8202, Section 8): ... “A blockchain
network is only as strong as the aggregate of all the existing nodes participating in the
network. If all the nodes share similar hardware, software, geographic location, and
messaging schema then there exists a certain amount of risk associated with the possi-
bility of undiscovered security vulnerabilities” [11]. If there is one lesson learned from
the past two decades of viruses in PC computers, it is that a relatively homogeneous
network of systems (e.g. Windows only) is less resilient than one consisting of a diverse
set of operating systems (e.g. mix of Windows, Linux, MacOS, AIX, etc).
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As a blockchain networks carry increasingly valuable virtual assets [12], the question of
blockchain resiliency and survivability becomes crucial to the business value proposition
of the blockchain network.
• Consensus protocol input: The state of a node/device can be used as an additional input
parameter into the consensus-making protocol used in the blockchain network. The idea
is that the node that mines or forges new blocks shoule be in a compliant or “healthy”
state. Here “compliance” means that the node is deemed satisfactory as evaluated
against the appraisal policies driving the network. Thus, for example, the compliance
status of a node could be a factor in (input parameter into) the consensus-algorithm of
a given blockchain network.
Using the specific example of the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol in Ethereum [13], the
compliance status of nodes could be an additional factor in selecting the the PoS valida-
tor node – in addition to the current selection factors (e.g. staking-age, randomization,
node’s stake amount, lowest hash value, etc.).
• Confidence in Smart Contract Platforms: Smart contracts have been a major feature
of attraction for blockchain platforms such as Ethereum. However, smart contracts
themselves may introduce various unforeseen weaknesses and vulnerabilities [14].
For example, one concern pertains to the accurate execution and the correct reporting
of the outcome of the smart contract (at the application level). One key issue here is
that even if a smart contract (visibly readable on a node) was digitally signed by its
author at the application level, there is no guarantee when the contract binary was
being loaded into memory to be executed (e.g. by the CPU of the node) that the code
has not been modified or contaminated by malware. Here, the availability of Trusted
Execution Environments (TEE) capability within the node’s hardware can mitigate this
problem to a large extent (e.g. Intel’s SGX [15, 16]). However, attestation evidence
must be conveyed by the node that: (i) the node possesses true TEE functionality, and
(ii) that the contract code was indeed executed by (inside of) the TEE.
• Legal trust framework for operating rules: The technical means to provide node attesta-
tions can play an important role in certain types of blockchain networks. For example,
in a consortium-based permissioned (private) blockchain network, attestations can be a
key factor in the consortium’s Legal Trust Framework (LTF) that governs the operating
rules of the membership.
Operational standards (profiles) that are co-developed and defined by the members of
the consortium – based on stable technical standards published by standards-organization
such as the TCG, IEEE and IETF – becomes a quantifiable input into the legal con-
tracts that make-up the LTF framework of the consortium. The legal contracts can
be specific regarding member’s obligations in the realm of deployment of nodes and
related services. (e.g. members’ nodes must use valid X.509 device certificates at all
times). This co-development of operational standards means easier acceptance by the
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membership. Furthermore, a joint development of operational standards allows costs-
sharing among members. Over time it lowers the shared operational costs of running
the network as a whole.
However, if a member is able to misrepresent their contribution to the shared opera-
tional costs, then the consortium looses its unbiased governance abilities. Attestations
among consortium member nodes ensures operating rules are applied fairly across all
members. Node attestations essentially provide the basis for technical trust, which in
turn allows business trust to be attained by virtue the operational specifications be-
ing agreed-upon and observed in the consortium. Other related contracts and Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) for the network as a whole can also defined in terms of these
operational capabilities.
3 Overview of the Concept of Attestations
In this section we briefly review at a high-level a number concepts which underlie the notion
of device attestations that is core to the area of trusted computing.
3.1 The Notion of the TCB
As computer systems evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, and as Local Area Networks (LANs)
and peripheral devices proliferated the question of the security of computers systems became
crucial in the networked world. This is true not only in the context of government and defense
sectors, but also in the broader networked computing world. In the mid-1980s efforts such as
Project Athena at MIT [17, 18] represented the leading edge of networked computing tech-
nology, and numerous security challenges – such as scalable authentication and authorization
– were identified in these early years.
In the context of trustworthy computing, a landmark event in December 1985 was the
publication of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense. The TCSEC was a significant step forward because it defined the notion
of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). The core notion of the TCB is that if protecting the
entire computer systems was too costly or technically infeasible, then a portion of the sys-
tem needs to be isolated that provides trustworthy behavior. That is, a domain “boundary”
needs to be identified or defined in the system within which security can be guaranteed. This
TCB domain boundary must demarcate “the security-relevant portions” of the system. This
concept of the TCB became fundamental to ensuing efforts in the area of trustworthy com-
puting, and the TCB portion became the focus of attention of new technical innovations in
the following two decades. All subsequent expressions of trustworthy computing and security
policy would be described in terms of impact and relevance to the TCB.
Although the TCSEC criteria focused mostly on defining the operating system security
domain, it is important to remember that the operating system is not the sole TCB component
in a computing platform. The hardware also plays a significant role, notably in the context
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Figure 1: Overview of the concept of the Attester and Attesting Environment
of memory page isolation where a central tenet is the idea of kernel-mode isolation (namely
ring-0) and application-mode (namely ring-3) process separation contexts [19]. From the
operating system perspective the hardware is thought to be trusted because the operating
system has no alternative way to test and verify that the hardware is behaving correctly.
The threat of hardware vulnerability motivated the computing industry to form the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [20] in the late 1990s where the notion of a hardware
root-of-trust was used to distinguish the security relevant portions of a hardware platform.
The TCG defined trusted computing more organically by building upon granular compo-
nents that were described as shielded locations and protected capabilities. Shielded locations
are “...A place (memory, register, etc.) where it is safe to operate on sensitive data; data lo-
cations that can be accessed only by protected capabilities”. Protected capabilities are “...the
set of commands with exclusive permission to access shielded locations.” By extension, all
components that could be classified as shielded locations or protected capabilities is what
defines the hardware security domain wherein the TCB software executes.
3.2 The Attester and Attesting Environment
Implied in the TCSEC definition of the TCB is the required ability for a TCB to be reviewed.
Originally, security review was a manual process involving a certification process. However,
subsequent evolution and automation of security review makes feasible the reporting of much
of the TCBs internal state – or what we refer to as attestations. The fundamental idea of
attestations of a “thing” (e.g. a computing device) is that of the conveyance of truthful infor-
mation regarding the (internal) state of the thing being attested to. In the related literature
on trustworthy computing the term “measurement” is used to mean the act of collecting
(introspecting) claims or assertions about the internal state, and delivering these claims as
evidence to an external party or entity for automated review and security assessment.
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However, as we know today computing environments can be structurally complex and may
consist of multiple elements (e.g. memory, CPU, storage, networking, firmware, software),
and computational elements can be linked and composed to form computational pipelines,
arrays and networks. Thus, the dilemma is that not every computational element can be
expected to be capable of attestation. Furthermore, attestation-capable elements may not be
capable of attesting every computing element with which it interacts. The attestation capa-
bility could in fact be a computing environment itself. The act of monitoring trustworthiness
attributes, collecting them into an interoperable format, integrity protecting, authenticating
and conveying them requires a computing environment – one that should be separate from
the one being attested. Figure 1 illustrates the recognition of this distinction, namely of the
target environment being attested to, and the attesting environment that performs the work
stated above1.
The complexity of the problem has led to a number of efforts in industry to define an
attestation architecture that incorporates some of these key concepts – such as the concept
of the root-of-trust – and to develop standards that implement attestation concepts. The
roles and functions of the attestation architecture is shown in Figure 1 and will be discussed
at length in the ensuing sections. In a nutshell, in Figure 1 an attester conveys evidence of
trustworthiness (of the attested target environment) to a verifier entity. The verifier operates
based on policies that are supplied by the owner of the verifier.
We believe that an attestation architecture should define the attestation roles in the
ecosystem (i.e. Attester, Verifier, Endorser, Relying Party, and Owner), the messages they
exchange, their structure and the various ways in which roles may be hosted, combined and
divided amongst the various entities involved in real-world deployments. These roles should
remain true independent of the specific use-cases or deployments of systems having attestation
functions. Furthermore, the attestation messages should be built on an information model
that defines its trustworthiness semantics as well as on a data model that supports broad
interoperability options. The information model and various data model representations
would then be realized as data structures, data structure encodings and protocol bindings
for conveying attestation messages, that are aimed at specific deployment cases or “profiles”
(e.g. PC client devices, constrained IoT devices, various network equipment such as routers,
mobile devices, server chassis, etc.).
Finally, from architecture perspective we believe that the verifier should be able to under-
stand the trustworthiness properties of both the target environments as well as the attestation
capability itself (at the attester). This must be true for any set of assertions within an attes-
tation flow between the attester and the verifier. Thus, the trustworthiness of the attestation
capability itself should be a core consideration of a well-designed attestation architecture.
This may mean that the attestation architecture should anticipate the possibility of recursive
or layered TCBs, each having believable and verifiable trust properties, something that may
complicate implementations considerably.
1An example of an attesting environment is the Quoting Enclave within Intel SGX [21, 15].
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3.3 Reference Values and Endorsements
Another key concept in trustworthy computing is that of endorsements from supply-chain
entities regarding one or more components that are incorporated into the target environment.
In practice, there is a point at which ultimately a portion of the computing environment
trustworthiness must be established via non-automated means. A root-of-trust refers to
a TCB element that ascribes trust through non-automated means. These non-automated
means include things such design reviews, manufacturing process audits and physical security.
A trustworthy attestation mechanism depends on trustworthy manufacturing and supply-
chain practices. This manufacturer’s claims of trustworthiness (of its product) is expressed
through endorsements, which most commonly take the form of digital certificates signed by
the manufacturer [22, 23].
Thus, a manufacturer of a component (e.g. firmware for hardware component) can pub-
lish a “known good” or “expected” value for a given firmware file. In the simplest form, this
endorsement could be a cryptographic digest (i.e. hash) of the firmware file which is authen-
ticated to its vendor or place of origin using a digitally signed structure (e.g. X.509 attribute
certificates [24]). The significance of signing by the manufacturer using its public-private
key pair is that it asserts these values to be authentic, as an endorsement for that product.
Entities seeking to use the product (i.e. firmware file) can validate that attested values corre-
sponding to the digests found in the endorsed values are known or expected. Thus, we refer
to the digest as a known good value in this context.
As we will discuss below, an attestation architecture should distinguish between these
more static endorsements issued by a supply-chain entity from the evidence issued by an
attester during its runtime. As shown in Figure 1 the Attester creates attestation evidence
(signed assertions) that are conveyed to a Verifier for appraisal. The appraisal process com-
pares the received evidence against the known good values (i.e. endorsements) obtained from
supply-chain entities – referred to as endorsers. A good architecture should support multiple
forms of appraisals (e.g. software integrity verification, device composition and configuration
verification, device identity and provenance verification, etc.). Out of this appraisal process
the attestation results are generated, signed and then conveyed to relying parties. The attes-
tation results provide the operational integrity basis by which relying parties may determine
the level of confidence to place in the application data or other application-specific operations
that follow.
4 A Canonical Attestations Architecture
Recently, the notion of attestations has have garnered interest within different technical
standards organizations and industry consortiums, beyond the TCG alliance (e.g. FIDO
Alliance [25], Global-Platform [26], IETF [27]).
A broader set of use-cases are also emerging, ranging from attestations by routing fabrics
to attestations by low-power Internet-of-things (IoT) networks. Regardless of the use-case,
the notion of attestations holds true due to the universal need in the digital world to obtain
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Figure 2: Canonical architecture for attestations (after [32, 33, 34])
assurance regarding the expected working environments and their security and resiliency
properties. As an increasing portion of the economy moves onto digital platforms operating
using complex and often invisible infrastructures (e.g. cloud platforms, virtualization, edge
computing, mobile wallets, etc.), the more crucial the need for attestation underpinnings as
a supporting infrastructure.
In this section, we discuss further the notion of attestations and present a canonical ar-
chitecture that is currently being developed by several industry organizations (e.g. TCG [28],
IETF [27]). The hope is that a canonical attestation architecture will allow standards to be
developed that implement the various protocols and flows for relevant sectors and products
(routers and network equipment [29, 30], mobile devices [26], cloud stacks [31], etc). By
having a common reference architecture, different efforts can share common terminologies,
concepts and implementations and therefore affect a reduction in costs of developing and de-
ploying the infrastructures supporting cyber-resilience and trustworthy computing generally.
4.1 Entities, Roles and Actors
The attestation architecture of [32] defines of a set of roles that implement attestation flows.
Roles are hosted by actors, where actors are deployment entities. Different deployment models
may coalesce or separate various actor components and may call for differing attestation
conveyance mechanisms. However, different deployment models do not fundamentally modify
attestation roles, the responsibilities of each role, nor the information that flows between
them. In the following sections, we may use the actor and role terminology interchangeably
when appropriate in order to simplify discussion (see Figure 2).
• Attester: The Attester (e.g. target device) provides attestation Evidence to a Verifier.
The Attester must have an attestation identity that is used to authenticate the conveyed
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Evidence and establishes an attestation endpoint context. The attestation identity is
often established as part of a manufacturing process that embeds identity credentials
in the entity that implements an Attester.
• Verifier: The Verifier accepts Endorsements (from Endorsers) and Evidence (from the
Attester) then conveys Attestation Results to one or more Relying Parties. The Verifier
must evaluate the received Endorsements and Evidences against the internal appraisal
policies chosen or configured by the owner of the Verifier [34]. The Attestation Service
Provider (ASP) is typically the actor which implements the Verifier role.
• Relying Party: The Relying Party (RP) role is implemented by a resource manager that
accepts Attestation Results from a Verifier. The Relying Party trusts the Verifier to
correctly evaluate attestation Evidence and Policies, and to produce a correct Attesta-
tion Result. Thus, we assume that the RP and the Verifier has a business relationship
(e.g. see the SAML2.0 [35] model for a similar business relationship assumption) or
some other basis for trusting one another. The Relying Party may further evaluate
Attestation Results according to Policies it may receive from an Owner. The Relying
Party may take actions based on the evaluation of the Attestation Results.
• Endorser: An Endorser role is typically implemented by a supply chain entity that cre-
ates reference Endorsements (i.e., claims, values or measurements that are known to be
authentic). Endorsements contain assertions about the device’s intrinsic trustworthi-
ness and correctness properties. Endorsers implement manufacturing, productization,
or other techniques that establish the trustworthiness properties of the Attesting Envi-
ronment. This is shown as flows (a) and (b) in Figure 2.
• Owner of Verifier: The Verifier Owner role has policy oversight for the Verifier. It
generates Appraisal Policy for Evidence and conveys the policy to the Verifier. The
Verifier Owner sets policy for acceptable (or unacceptable) Evidence and Endorsements
that may be supplied by Attesters and Endorsers respectively.
The policies determine the trustworthiness state of the Attester and how best to rep-
resent the state to Relying Parties in the form of Attestation Results. The Verifier
Owner manages Endorsements supplied by Endorsers and may maintain a database of
acceptable and/or unacceptable Endorsements. The Verifier Owner authenticates Ver-
ifiers and maintains lists of trustworthy Endorsers, peer Verifiers and Relying Parties
with which the Verifier might interact.
• Owner of Relying Party: The Relying Party (RP) Owner role has policy oversight for
the Relying Party (RP). The RP-Owner sets appraisal policy regarding acceptable (or
unacceptable) Attestation Results about an Attester that was produced by a Verifier.
The RP-Owner sets appraisal policies on the Relying Party that authorizes use of At-
testation Results in the context of the relevant services, management consoles, network
equipment, an enforcement policies used by the Relying Party. The Relying Party
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Owner authenticates the Relying Party and maintains lists of trustworthy Verifiers and
peer Relying Parties with which the Relying Party might interact.
• Evidence: The Attestation Evidence is a role message containing assertions from the
Attester role. Evidence should have freshness and recentness claims that help establish
Evidence relevance. For example, a Verifier supplies a nonce that can be included with
the Evidence supplied by the Attester. Evidence typically describes the state of the
device or entity. Normally, Evidence is collected in response to a request (e.g. challenge
from Verifier).
Evidence may also describe historical device states (e.g. the state of the Attester during
initial boot). It may also describe operational states that are dynamic and likely to
change from one request to the next. Attestation protocols may be helpful in providing
timing context for correct evaluation of Evidence that is highly dynamic.
• Endorsements: Endorsement structures contain reference Claims that are signed by an
entity performing the Endorser role (e.g. supply-chain entity or manufacturer of the
target device). Endorsements are reference values that may be used by Owners to form
attestation Policies.
Some endorsements may be considered “intrinsic” in that they convey static trust-
worthiness properties relating to a given actor (e.g., device, environment, component,
TCB, layer, RoT, or entity). These may exist as part of the design, implementation,
validation and manufacture of that actor implementation.
An Endorser (e.g. manufacturer) may assert immutable and intrinsic claims in its
Endorsements, which then allows the Verifier to carry-out appraisal of the Attester
(e.g. device) without requiring Attester reporting beyond simple authentication.
4.2 Summary of an attestation event
Figure 2 illustrates the canonical attestation model. When an Attester (e.g. target device)
seeks to perform an action at the Relying Party (e.g. access resources or services controlled
by the Relying Party) the Attester must first be evaluated by the Verifier. Among its inputs,
the Verifier obtains endorsements from the Endorser (e.g. device manufacturer) in flow (a)
of Figure 2. Prior to allowing any entity to be evaluated by the Verifier, the Owner of the
Verifier must first configure a number of appraisal policies into the Verifier for evaluating
Evidences. The policies are use-case specific but may require other information about the
Attester (or User) to be furnished to the Verifier. This is shown in Step 1 of Figure 2.
Similarly, in Step 2 the owner of the Relying Party (e.g. resource or service) must configure
a number of Appraisal Policies for Attestation Results into the Relying Party.
When the Attester requests access to the resources at the Relying Party (Step 3), it will
be redirected to the Verifier (Step 4) – the understanding being that the Attester must deliver
attestation Evidence to the Verifier. Included here are the endorsement(s) that the Attester
obtained previously from the Endorser (flow(b) of Figure 2). The flow represented by Step 3
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Figure 3: Two variations in attestation flows: (a) The Passport flow, and (b) Background-
check flow (after [33])
may be multi-round and may include a nonce challenge that the Attester must include in its
computation of the Evidence as a means to establish freshness.
After verification and appraisal of the Attester completes, the Verifier delivers the Attes-
tation Result to the Relying Party in Step 5. The Relying Party in its turn must evaluate the
Result against its own policies (set previously in Step 2). If the Relying Party is satisfied with
its evaluation of the Attestation Result regarding the Attester, it will provide the Attester
with permission to complete the action it seeks to perform (e.g. access resources at the RP).
4.3 Variations in the Attestation Flows
There are various possible variations to the message flows shown in Figure 2. These variations
may be useful and applicable to use-cases where certain constraints are present (e.g. IoT
device with minimal computing power, devices with limited connectivity, etc.).
Two (2) variations are shown in Figure 3. In the first case in Figure 3(a), the Attester
delivers its Attestation Evidence to the Verifier as before. However, the Verifier returns
the signed Attestation Result to the Attester, which then wields it to the Relying Party.
This variation is akin to the “front-channel” flow in the Web-Browser Single Sign-On (Web-
SSO) [35] model based on a mediated authentication service by a trusted third-party [36].
Here the Attester’s task is to convey unchanged the (signed) Attestation Results produced
by the Verifier. This flow is referred to as the “passport flow” in [27] because the Attester is
wielding the Attestation Results in the manner of a signed passport of permit.
In the second variation shown in Figure 3(b), the Attester delivers its attestation Evidence
direct to the Relying Party (i.e. resource manager). Being a reliant party – reliant on the
Verifier to evaluate attestation Evidences – the Relying Party simply forwards the Evidence to
the Verifier. After the Verifier completes appraisal of the attestation Evidence, it returns the
Attestation Results to the Relying Party directly. This flow is referred to as the “background
13
Figure 4: Example of Composite Device Attestations
check flow” in [27] – or “back-channel” in SAML2.0 literature [35] – because the delivery of
the Attestation Result occurs between the Verifier and the Relying Party over a one-to-one
channel without the assistance of the Attester.
4.4 Composite Attestations
In some cases, an attestation Evidence yielded by an Attester may in fact consists of other
Evidence (e.g. from other local components) collated by that Attester (Figure 4).
We refer to this kind of attester as the Composite Device Attester and the evidence as
Composite Device Evidence. In a composite attester scenario, we assume local components
have attestation capabilities that generate evidence. This evidence is conveyed locally to a
lead attester that assembles the various sets of evidences, possibly including evidence that it
directly collects as well. Subsequently, the composite device lead attester conveys composite
evidence to the relevant Verifier. The composite attester may assert a claim that it was
the entity that assembled a piece of component evidence and include this assertion in the
composite device evidence it supplies.
4.5 Layered Attestations
Another mode of deployment for the attestation architecture is in the appraisal of software
(firmware) modules relating to the boot-up sequence within a given device. As mentioned
previously, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) defined a number of hardware-based “roots-
of-trust” (RoT) related to the TPM chip [2]. The idea was that because the TPM hardware
was tamper-resistant and provided shielded memory and storage, these features could be used
as a root-of-trust for ensuring that a TPM-enabled device could boot-up safely and correctly.
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Figure 5: Overview of the concept of the Layered Device Attestations
However, the TPM-based approach may not be suitable for various other use-cases, and
not all devices can suitably support a TPM. Constrained devices such as IoT devices (Internet
of Things) – such a low-power sensors and tiny low-cost devices – may not be able to support
a TPM or any dedicate security processor. More importantly, not every device architecture
maps onto the assumptions underlying the TPM design. In some cases, once the device
completes loading the low-level software – whose integrity can be protected by keeping a
hash of the code in the registers of the TPM – there comes a point in the boot-sequence
where the TPM ceases to be (i.e. unable to be) the root-of-trust for the next piece of
software being loaded. That is, there needs to be a variant of the attestation model which
can be aided in its initial phases by the use of some hardware-based functions and relevant
manufacturer endorsements, but which would require it to be reliant on attestations by other
pieces of software in the boot-sequence. We refer to this generically as layered attestations
(Figure 5).
One specific example of layered attestations can be found in the Robust Internet-of-Things
(RIoT) architecture [37]. The approach employs a combination of a device-secret that is set
by the device manufacturer during production (e.g. fusing during manufacturing). The core
idea is to use the device secret and a keyed hash function to derive other secrets (e.g. keys)
to be used by the next layer in the boot-sequence.
Although a detailed discussion of layered attestations is beyond the scope of the current
work, there are a number of desirable properties for layered attestations (see Section 5 of [38]
for an extensive discusion). First, each layer in the sequence must be unambiguously dis-
tinguishable (e.g. using a key derivation scheme that provides a unique key for each layer).
Secondly, the next layer must be “inspectable” be the current layer. Inspection may simply
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be to compute a hash value for computation of a layer identity or may involve more rigorous
proofs of integrity. Thirdly, there must be a way to achieve layer sequencing – which may dif-
ferent for each type of device. Finally, there must be a way for a layer to provide Attestation
Evidence of itself that includes evidences for all previous layers in the sequence. Trust in a
current layer depends on the trustworthiness of all previous layers. Consequently, a Verifier
of layered attestation must evaluate Attestation Evidence of all the dependent layers before
it can reason about trust in the current layer. The set of layered evidence must therefore be
communicated within the evidence flow emanating from the Attester.
The TCG has formalized and standardized the notion of layered attestations in the Device
Identity Composition Engine (DICE) specifications [39, 40]. This standardization process is
important not only from a device-manufacturers perspective (and other supply-chain entities),
but also from the perspective of the various service providers (e.g. ASPs and Relying Parties)
that together with the supply-chain entities form the ecosystem that supports interoperable
implementations of the attestation architecture. Currently, the DICE approach has been
implemented for hardware intended for cloud platforms (e.g. Project Cerberus [41]).
5 Attestation of Nodes in Blockchain Networks
In this section we explore the application of the canonical attestation architecture in Sec-
tion 4 to the broad case of blockchain networks. We pay close attention to permissioned
(private) blockchain networks as a means to constrain the scope the problem. We envisage
that attestation architectures and technologies discussed in the current work may be of inter-
est in the first instance to communities arranged as consortiums seeking to employ blockchain
technology and distributed ledger technologies (DLT) generally to solve a specific problem in
the community. Currently, several organizations have embarked on creating the technology
and infrastructures to effect permissioned blockchains (e.g. R3/Corda [42], TradeLens [43],
PharmaLedger [44]). In the financial industry, several organizations are exploring the notion
of private/permissioned blockchains for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of business
settlements within their network [45].
There are several high-level desirable features for nodes in a blockchain network:
• Independence of nodes in verifying other nodes: A node must be able to take-on the
role of a Verifier of the attestation Evidence generated by peer nodes. This means that
nodes must have awareness of the identity of its peer nodes. Similarly, a node must be
able to generate a signed Attestation Evidence as required (e.g. when demanded by its
owner, by the consortium, by peer nodes, or as required by the consensus-protocol in
the network).
• Persistence of transaction signing key over reboots: Since a node’s transaction signing
key may be used in some consensus-protocols to receive remunerations (e.g. BTCs,
“gas”), this private-public key pair must be persistent (i.e. not lost) across reboots of the
node-device. This must be true independent of the hardware/software implementation
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Figure 6: Overview of a consortium arrangement of a permissioned blockchain network
of the node.
• Inaccessible transaction signing keys when in unapproved configuration: Since a node
must only operate in a configuration and state that is known to and approved by the
node’s owner, the transaction signing key(s) must not be usable or accessible by the
node if it is in an “unhealthy” (i.e. unapproved) state. Among others, this is to prevent
malware (i.e. viruses) from using transaction signing keys to perform unauthorized
transactions, thereby harming its owner.
• Observance and enforcement of governance polices: In a consortium arrangement, there
must be a way for the consortium organization to mandate (force) observance by a node
of the consortium-wide policies and operating rules. There are various mechanisms that
can achieve this effect, one of which is to use Attestation Results as one of the inputs into
the consensus-protocol (e.g. if a node is not in one of several configurations approved
by the consortium, then the node will never be selected to forge new blocks in a Proof
of Stake protocol).
Figure 6 illustrates a number of attestation flows that may occur in a consortium-based
permissioned blockchain network. The flow (a) in Figure 6 illustrates situations where the
consortium governance administration seeks to verify the attestations produced by nodes
belonging to members. This “right to verify” may be enshrined within the governance op-
erating contracts of the consortium. In flow (b) nodes are performing mutual attestations
of peer nodes in an independent manner (i.e. independent of any centralized entity such as
the consortium administration entity). In flow (c), a member may employ its own verifier to
evaluate nodes belonging to other members in the consortium.
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Figure 7: Architecture for attestations in a permissioned blockchain network
5.1 Domains, Nodes and Functions
Following from the general entities and roles defined in Section 4.1, in the following we apply
these to the entities that participate in a blockchain network (Figure 7):
• Consortium Verifier: The consortium as a community owns and operates one or more
of its own Verifiers (e.g. Attestation Service Provider) for the purpose of appraising
Evidence conveyed by nodes in the network against the consortium’s Appraisal Policies.
• Consortium-wide Appraisal Policies: Part of the governance of the community is the
establishment of a shared set of appraisal policies for Attestation Evidences and Attes-
tation Results. Step (a) of Figure 7 illustrates the conveyance of the consortium-wide
appraisal policies to the domains (e.g. the policy store in the management console of
domain owner). The intent of Step (a) is to denote that the consortium-wide appraisal
policies must be communicated down to the Local Verifier in each node in that domain.
Copies of the Appraisal Policies are also recorded on the ledger (i.e. digest or hash of
the policies) to allow for future independent audit, such as comparing member policies
against the member-agreed baseline policies of the consortium.
• Member Verifier: Each member owns and operates one or more or its own Domain
Verifier. Thus, for example, in Figure 7 a Member X owns the Domain Verifier DV1 in
Domain D1. Each member also operates a local protected Log, which is only accessible
by nodes and other entities in the domain.
• Member Appraisal Policies: Each member may set its own appraisal policies for Attes-
tation Evidences and Attestation Results for its domain. Ideally, member-level policies
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should not conflict with consortium-level policies. The consortium has the opportunity
to use independent audit and compliance entity to ensure that correctness evaluation
can be performed. Step (b) and Step (c) in Figure 7 illustrates the conveyance of the
consortium-wide appraisal policies and the domain specific appraisal policies to the
nodes of the corresponding member (with digests recorded on the ledger).
• Node Local Verifier and Local Attester: Each node in the blockchain network implements
a Local Verifier (LV) and Local Attester (LA). The Local Attester creates attestation
Evidence about the node and conveys the evidence to a Verifier (i.e. its own Local
Verifier, its Domain Verifier, the Consortium Verifier, or another node’s Local Verifier).
• Audit Log: A domain maintains an audit log system as means to store and retain
attestation Evidences (from devices within its domain) and Attestation Results coming
from the various Node Local Verifiers as well as the Consortium Verifier (CV). The
entries of the local log (i.e. hash of entries) can also be recorded on the ledger. This
permits independent audit and compliance entities to check the results are reasonable
appraisal results.
There are two broad categories of scenarios that can benefit from attestations. In the first
scenario, a Local Attester in a given node conveys attestation Evidence to a Verifier that is
either located in its home domain or in the consortium domain. In the second scenario, a
Local Attester in a given node conveys attestation Evidence to a Verifier located in another
node in a peer-to-peer fashion. We discuss these scenarios below.
5.2 Appraisal by Domain Verifiers
There are a number of use-cases related to manageability of nodes/devices that may benefit
from the ability for a node to convey Evidence regarding its current configuration and other
computations state. We use Figure 8 to illustrate.
In Step (1) and Step (2) of Figure 8 the Local Attester (LA1) in the node conveys
attestation evidence to (i) its own Domain Verifier (DV1) and (ii) to the Consortium Verifier
(CV). Depending on the specific-use case, these two evidences may differ. Thus, for example,
the Domain Verifier may be concerned about both the health of its node and other system
attributes of its node (e.g. did a GPU card just malfunctioned). The Evidence conveyed by
the Local Attester (LA1) to the Consortium Verifier (CV) may include information that is
of interest to the consortium administration. For example, the Consortium Verifier may be
seeking status information regarding the versions of the firmware and software on the node,
when the last patch was installed, and so on. The goal of the consortium’s appraisal policies
is to ensure that members and their nodes comply to the operating rules of the consortium
organization as defined in its legal trust framework and other related membership contracts.
Note that these two areas of interest – of the Domain Verifier on one hand and the
Consortium Verifier on the other hand – are complementary to each other. The understanding
here is that the survival of the permission blockchain network as a whole is a function of the
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Figure 8: Attestations of a node by its Domain Verifier
survival of individual nodes in that network. When nodes are “healthy” then the network is
also healthy.
It is worthwhile to note that the Relying Parties (RP) in these two scenarios are the
Domain Owner (i.e. node owner) and the Consortium Administration respectively. Thus,
in Step (3) and Step (4) the attestation results are conveyed by the Consortium Verifier
and by the Domain Verifier (DV1) respectively. The Domain Owner as a relying party to
both of these attestation results may take action based on the received results. For example,
it could update the firmware of the node, to bring the node offline, and so on. Thus, the
owner’s foremost concern could be the visibility into the state of its nodes and maintaining
the security and integrity of these nodes.
5.3 Appraisal by Peer Nodes
One of the key tenets of decentralized computing as exemplified by blockchain systems such as
Bitcoin is the autonomy of nodes in performing some computations (e.g. Proof-of-Work [46],
Proof-of-Stake [13], etc.). To this end, ideally nodes must be able to appraise other nodes
as part of a consensus-making protocol. The ability to provide attestation evidence (e.g.
regarding a node’s current configuration) enhances the acceptability of the outcomes of peered
computations such as PoW and PoS. Other participants in the network obtain some degree
of assurance that fairness has been maintained (e.g. that nodes have equal hash-powers or
hash-rates). This is especially important for consortium organizations whose members may
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Figure 9: Appraisal of attestations by peer nodes
be competitors.
Another important use-case pertains to nodes that act as gateways between two distinct
blockchain networks [38]. Here, the goal of gateways is the establishment of trust for scenarios
involving high value transactions. For certain types of virtual assets (e.g. proof of legal
ownerships of real assets) a change of legal ownership effected on a blockchain may necessitate
that the evidence be moved from one blockchain to another (e.g. from the seller’s blockchain
to the buyer’s preferred blockchain). This movability of virtual assets across blockchain
systems is crucial for the scalability of blockchains as an economic medium for business
transactions at a global scale.
The appraisal by peer nodes is represented by Figure 9. Here a node Xn is required
to provide attestation Evidence to other nodes in the network (e.g. node Yn) as part of
consensus-making (e.g. node Xn to be selected to forge new blocks in PoS [13]). In Step (1)
of Figure 9 the attestation evidence from node Xn is conveyed to the Local Verifier (LV2)
within node Yn. Now, LV2 will evaluate the received evidence based on the appraisal policies
(for Evidences and Attestation Results) which it possesses. These policies were previously
configured by the Domain Verifier owner (node owner) in Step (a) of Figure 9. If the results
of the attestations conforms to the appraisal policies, the node Yn (as its own Relying Party)
may then take action (e.g. confirm proposed new blocks in PoW).
6 Attestation of Virtualized Nodes: Future Challenges
Since the emergence of the Bitcoin system [46] in 2008, there has been significant development
and departure from the original Bitcoin conception of the topology of nodes (i.e. mining
nodes). One key idea in Bitcoin is that the use of physically-separate nodes (i.e. mining
rigs) – each with its own copy of the full ledger – would provide a degree of resilience of the
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network to attackers who wish to skew or compromise the network. An attacker would need
to successfully attack a majority (e.g. 51 percent) of the physically-separate nodes in order
to compromise the network as a whole [8, 7]. The Ethereum system [47] represented a break
from classic Bitcoin topology by expanding the programmability of the blockchain through
the use of “smart contracts” that operate within the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The
EVM is essentially stack machine [48] that operates in a virtual space made available on the
nodes of Ethereum.
6.1 Cloud Computing, CaaS and BaaS
Given the complexity of operating nodes and the resources needed to maintain a network of
nodes, it is reasonable to expect that the nascent virtual assets [12, 49] industry will look
to cloud computing as a means to increase scale while reducing operational costs. Indeed,
currently new forms of cloud-based offerings have begun to emerge marketed to various
blockchain-based use cases. These offerings range from Container as a Service (CaaS) to
Blockchain as a Service (BaaS). In the CaaS case, the node-owner can create an image
(e.g. Docker image) of the node and have it execute in the CaaS infrastructure (e.g. IBM
cloud [50]). In the BaaS case, the entire blockchain network can be hosted on a third-party
infrastructure (e.g. Microsoft Azure BaaS [51]).
However, several challenges remain to be addressed with regards to the CaaS and BaaS
models for blockchain networks. Some of the challenges related to nodes implemented in a
BaaS platform include: (i) the security of cryptographic keys of nodes in the cloud; (ii) the
integrity – and in some cases the confidentiality – of the ledger data held by nodes; (iii) the
secure migration of nodes – or processes implementing the node – from one virtualized stack
to another; (iv) malicious interference by adjacent processes in multi-tenant deployments; (v)
geographic diversity of the nodes; and so on.
6.2 Geographic diversity of nodes
Historically, geographic diversity has not been reliably enforced as part of a blockchain net-
work. For example, the bitcoin Proof-of-Oork (PoW) focuses mainly on how how quickly
the miner can solve the PoW cryptographic puzzle. For the resilience of the network, ide-
ally nodes (miners) should be geographically spread, and geo-politically diverse. Geopolitical
diversity has ramifications on the stability of the value of the virtual assets transacted on
the blockchain (e.g. see [52]). The attestation architecture we have described above permits
nodes/devices to provide evidence of its geolocation. For example, the work of [53] includes
the ability to report location coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude) of the attester de-
vice. In turn, this can be reinforced with geo-fence policies relevant to the specific deployment
scenario.
We believe that both geo-location evidence and geo-fence policy compliance should in fact
be integrated into the consensus protocol of the blockchain network (e.g. PoW, PoS or future
variants) where the consensus protocol enforces geo-diversity. This should be true including
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for nodes implemented using CaaS or BaaS technology. Using the PoS example, a node’s
eligibility factors – to be selected as the validator node to forge the next block – should
include the geo-location of the node and the geo-locations of the population of the other
eligible nodes. Using the peer-appraisal approach outlined in Section 5.3, a community of
nodes could collectively self-enforce this geo-diversity requirement as part of their consensus-
making algorithm.
A similar notion in the context of IP routing – referred to as trusted path routing –
has been proposed in [54], where routers (i.e. routing nodes) in a traditional IP network
employ attestation of peers to exclude routers whose attestation evidence does not meet a
policy agreed upon by the community of nodes. Although trusted path routing envisages a
distributed attestation appraisal solution that approaches a distributed consensus algorithm,
more work could be directed at developing an “equivalent” of consensus algorithm but for
routers eligible to be in the trusted-path (i.e. route selection versus mining/forging blocks).
6.3 Integrity of Cloud Platforms
We believe that a secure attestations capability for nodes implemented on a BaaS (or CaaS)
platform represents an important factor for the business value-proposition of the BaaS model.
Attestations capability are needed at different layers of the virtualization stack according to
the corresponding “consumer” (Verifier and Relying Party) of the attestation information.
Thus, for example, the BaaS provider needs visibility into the state of the platform as a
whole, while the node-owner needs visibility into the integrity of its node. Counter-parties
in transactions may wish to see attestation results for nodes running on the BaaS platform,
and so on.
For cloud providers generally, there are a number of challenges in providing a reliable and
safe virtual computing infrastructures [55]. There needs to be a way to validate the integrity of
all firmware updates as a follow-up after the first-instruction integrity has been completed [56].
Thus, after the integrity of the first code or data loaded (e.g. from mutable non-volatile
media) has been verified (e.g. by either the cloud provider or the manufacturer), the integrity
of all firmware updates must also be achieved in a verifiable manner [37]. Achieving this higher
level of integrity implies that there could be several roots of trust (RoT) or chains of trust
(CoT) that are integral to the platform.
Furthermore, there needs to be a way to detect unauthorized access or corruption to the
software or firmwares during operations, and then take recourse to remediate this problem
– possibly in an automated or semi-automated manner. There needs to be a way to restore
firmware to state of integrity in cases where corruption has been detected [55]. Given the
nature of cloud data centers, recovery must be achievable in an automated fashion without
immediate attendance of the IT administrator. Manual recovery must of course be supported.
Recovery in this case generally means automatic self-recovery of the critical-to-boot portion(s)
of the firmware.
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6.4 Decentralized Roots of Trust
Another challenge pertains to the notion of decentralized roots of trust (d-RoT) put for-
ward in [38], where the logic of trust for a given multi-node (multi-component) environment
should be based on a decentralized cooperation of those nodes (components). The patterns
of roles, interaction and relationships we saw previously in Section 4 – namely endorsements,
attestation-evidence, appraisal and attestation-results – must hold true within individual
computer systems (which may consists of a complex interaction of parts and components) as
well as within a group of distributed computer systems (e.g. nodes on a blockchain network).
For example, within a single computer system a root-of-trust in a hardware CPU or a
core package containing multiple cores may have a design that justifies it as a root-of-trust.
However, when put together with other components on a system bus there maybe other
roots-of-trust present (e.g. system-on-chip (SoC), IP blocks and peripherals, etc) that may
have equal access to the system bus and therefore can assert themselves as a root-of-trust.
In this case there must be a distributed mechanism for bootstrapping trust in the system as
a whole based on a collective action or consensus of these roots-of-trust. Thus, there should
be (must be) be a distributed trust logic being applied at this microcosm level of components
(“nodes”) within one environment (the computer system as a whole).
Equally, the distributed trust logic must also apply at the macrocosm level consisting
of multiple computer systems, each of which are acting as a distinct node participating
with other nodes within a blockchain network. The blockchain network becomes a natural
extension of the principles and properties described in [38] (e.g. group reporting, group
computation participation, etc.), with the appropriate attention given to constructs at the
macro level, such as correct integration with the consensus algorithms and architecture for
establishing a d-RoT at the macro (peer-nodes) level.
7 Areas for Innovation
Despite the notion of device attestations nearing two-decades in age [2], the concepts around
attestations – such as endorsements, validations and freshness – are just recently coming
into wider attention in the broader industry. We believe more research needs to be applied,
and several areas of innovation still await the industry as a whole. In the context of the
application of the attestation architecture to blockchain networks the following represents a
brief list of possible areas for future innovation:
• Dynamic governance-policy setting based on attestations: For permissioned blockchains
in a consortium arrangement, the governance-level appraisal policies should be dynamic
in that their governance parameters should be subject to orchestrated change that
adapts to the shifting environment of software evolution and hardware replacement
cycles. This should be done in accordance with a combination of the parameter for
category type (e.g. node diversity) and the overall state of the population of nodes in
the network.
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Thus, given a node that addresses diversity (software and hardware diversity), if for
some reason the population of nodes become increasingly non-diverse (homogeneous)
up to defined threshold, then the governance policies should change to account for the
loss of expected diversity – and subsequently influence (i.e. modify) the consensus
algorithm toward stasis of an intended diversity metric. This could be a direct change
in the parameter of the consensus algorithm (e.g. majority parameter raised to 70
percent of population from 51 percent), or it could be an indirect change through new
policies being pushed into the domain-level (member level) appraisal policies (e.g. Local
Verifier in a node belonging to a subset of diverse nodes should prioritize members of
that same subset when accepting proposed consensus outcomes). The goal should be,
among others, to incentivize members of the consortium to deploy nodes that satisfy
the diversity category (software and hardware diversity) for the sake of the resilience
of the community as a whole.
• Attestation for migration of containerized-nodes: In the context of trusted hardware
used in virtualized platforms, one difficult challenge facing cloud data centers is trusted
migration of containers and functions [57, 58]. This is especially important for container-
ized nodes that carry sensitive information such as application-layer cryptographic keys
and related keying material, which may need higher availability.
By design, a container is unaware of “where” it executes (i.e. the specific hardware
environment – model/version). However, as we have seen above, execution environment
endorsements necessarily describe a piece hardware (with its firmware and software).
This is crucial for reasoning about trust among multiple interrelated nodes. Given
that attestation-derived trust reaches past the containers’ presumed isolation domain,
the problem becomes complicated by the need for prescribing destination hardware (to
which a container is to be migrated) that provides “equivalent trust”, but where the
migration target might not exactly mimic the currently executing container. Properly
secured migration policy expects equivalent or better trust in the target migration
environment.
A related challenge facing trustworthy container migrations is how to automate the
verification (comparison) between the current execution environment versus the target
migration environment.
• Attestation for nodes of permissionless blockchain networks: To avoid confusion when
discussing permissionless blockchains, we employ the NIST definition of permissionless
blockchains [11], namely a system where all users’ permissions are equal and not set by
any administrator or consortium. Permissionless blockchain networks are decentralized
ledger platforms open to anyone publishing blocks, without needing permission from
any authority (see Section 2.1 of [11]).
One possible application of attestations in permissionless blockchains with anonymous
nodes (e.g. miners) is for the gradual establishment of a subset of attestation-capable
nodes that periodically report attestation-evidence at a regular basis to the public
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ledger. For simplicity, we refer to these as “honest-nodes”. Honest users wishing to
choose to have their transactions be processed by one or more of this subset of honest-
nodes can pre-register (i.e. self-declare) their public-keys to these honest-nodes. In
turn, when an honest-node searches through the list of unprocessed transactions (e.g.
in the UTXO model [59]), the node can choose only those new transactions which origi-
nated from pre-registered user public-keys, according to the attestation policy common
among the honest-nodes. Users can directly remunerate the honest-nodes (who suc-
cessfully created a block containing transaction from honest-users) by sending coins to
the address of these known honest-nodes.
In effect, this creates a segregation of honest-nodes from the broader population of
anonymous nodes in the permissionless blockchain, something that might be consid-
ered a form of semi-permissioned blockchain. This may provide a path forward for
blockchains that today suffer from the imbalance of hash-power, where some nodes
(i.e. mining pools) control too much hash-power and therefore introducing potential
instability into the blockchain. Such an approach is outlined in [60] based on the use
of certain types of anonymity-preserving keys in the TPM hardware (e.g. DAA [61],
EPID [62]).
• Blockchain-based Retention of Supply-Chain Endorsements: Beyond the challenges to
ensure that endorsements are correct and source-authentic, there is the industry chal-
lenge of ensuring the continual availability and update of endorsements, and the avail-
ability infrastructures and services (e.g. certificate services) which support attestation
verifications. From a business perspective there are at least two challenges faced by com-
mercial manufacturers: (i) a manufacturer ceases to exist, and/or (ii) an issuing CA
ceases to exist. A manufacturer may go out of business entirely, or undergo mergers with
other business entities. At the same time, the CA that issued a ceased-manufacturer
itself may also go out of business. Blockchain technology – consisting of multiple nodes
retaining full copies of the shared ledger – may provide a way to alleviate the lack of
endorsement availability and shifting source-authenticity challenges.
The basic notion is that when a manufacturer today creates a product and the en-
dorsements for that product, these endorsements could be “registered” on a special
blockchain (referred to as the Endorsements Ledger) that acts as a decentralized no-
tarization service for the endorsements. This approach complements the manufacturer
signature on an endorsement, and it allows a future verifier in possession of the product
to use the entries in the blockchain – referred to as endorsement-records – to validate
that: (1) the endorsement matches the product, and that (2) the endorsement is source-
authentic from the manufacturer at the time that the endorsement-record was created
(i.e. today) – even though at the future time of the verification the manufacturer may
no longer exists.
The blockchain endorsement-record must also include pointers to locations (e.g. archival
repositories) on the Internet where copies of the software/firmware for the product
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Figure 10: Overview of blockchain-based retention of endorsements
(and the corresponding endorsement objects) may be found. Since a manufacturer’s
endorsement for its software or firmware product typically include a hash of the soft-
ware/firmware, a future verifier who fetches the endorsement-record from the blockchain
obtains assurance that the copy of the product in its possession is a genuine product
(i.e. unmodified). Figure 10 provides an overview of this idea.
In the example of Figure 10, the endorsement-record (Step (b)) collates the hashes
(digests) of the various objects that support the verification of a manufacturer’s en-
dorsement (e.g. the endorsement or RIM [23, 63], manufacturer’s signing certificate,
CA’s root certificate, etc.) from Step (a). In essence, the endorsement-record becomes
akin to the root (top) of a Merkle hash-tree. The manufacturer also stores copies of the
relevant verification objects in a decentralized file repository system (e.g. IPFS [64])
to ensure the high-availability of these objects (Step (c)). The decentralized file repos-
itory must ensure availability of these object long into the future. Other traditional
methods, such as distributing via CD/DVD discs (e.g. for consumers of the product)
could also be performed. Finally, the manufacturer transmits the endorsement-record
from Step (b) onto the Endorsements Ledger in Step (d). The endorsement-record (as
a transaction on the blockchain) needs to include pointers to (e.g. URL/URI) to the
locations of these verification objects, such that any verifier can later easily fetch these
objects and perform endorsement verification.
8 Conclusions
As mentioned in the opening, we believe that there is a strong role for trusted computing
technologies, and more specially attestations technologies, in the growing area of blockchain
networks. The security, resiliency and interoperability of blockchain systems are important
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factors in the adoption of blockchain networks as the foundation of the future digital economy.
In the current work we have provided a high-level review of the notion of attestations, and
described the evolving new standard architecture for device attestations. The application
of this attestations architecture to the blockchain environment have been discussed. The
blockchain industry’s use of a common standard attestations architecture can ensure the best
chance for the interoperability of systems and networks, and offers the best path forward
towards achieving the survivability of various blockchain networks.
Several challenges remain to be addressed as new modes of implementations of blockchain
networks, such as virtualization and containerization, become attractive for deployers of
blockchains.
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